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Abstract 
We examined how the presence of an interpreter during an interview affects eliciting 
information and cues to deceit, whilst using a method that encourages interviewees to provide 
more detail (model statement, MS). A total of 199 Hispanic, Korean and Russian participants 
were interviewed either in their own native language without an interpreter, or through an 
interpreter. Interviewees either lied or told the truth about a trip they made during the last 
twelve months. Half of the participants listened to a MS at the beginning of the interview. 
The dependent variables were ‘detail’, ‘complications’, ‘common knowledge details’, ‘self-
handicapping strategies’ and ‘ratio of complications’. In the MS-absent condition, the 
interviews resulted in less detail when an interpreter was present than when an interpreter was 
absent. In the MS- present condition, the interviews resulted in a similar amount of detail in 
the interpreter present and absent conditions. Truthful statements included more 
complications and fewer common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies than 
deceptive statements, and the ratio of complications was higher for truth tellers than liars. The 
MS strengthened these results, whereas an interpreter had no effect on these results.  
 Keywords: interpreter, model statement, non-native speakers, information gathering, 
deception 
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Using the Model Statement to Elicit Information and Cues to Deceit  
in Interpreter-Based Interviews 
As a result of globalisation investigators and interviewees often do not share the same 
native language (Mulayim, Lai, & Norma, 2014), which can hinder the effectiveness of an 
investigative interview (Gibbons, 2001). In such circumstances an interpreter could become a 
vital part of the investigation. Deception researchers have started to carry out experimental 
research examining the effect of the presence of an interpreter on eliciting information and 
cues to deceit (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2016; Ewens et al., 2016b, c, d). This article 
builds upon this work, particularly on Ewens et al. (2016d), in the following manner: (i) We 
used a different control group (non-native English speakers speaking in their own languages) 
than Ewens et al. (2016a, b, c, d) who used English speakers speaking in English; (ii) unlike 
Ewens et al. (2016d), we introduced a control condition to experimentally examine the effect 
of a Model Statement on eliciting information; and (iii) in addition to ‘total detail’ (the only 
verbal cue examined in Ewens et al., 2016a, b, c, d) we examined three additional verbal 
cues: complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies.  
Total Detail 
A consistent finding in the work of Ewens and colleagues is that in interviews where 
interviewees speak in their own language through an interpreter fewer details are provided 
than when interviewees speak in their own language without an interpreter. There are two 
possible explanations for this. First, perhaps interpreters do not translate every detail the 
interviewee gives and information thus gets lost in translation. Second, perhaps interviewees 
say less with an interpreter present, because interruptions disrupt the interviewee’s train of 
thought and makes memory retrieval more difficult (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014; Nelson & 
Goodmon, 2003) or because an interviewee may decide to be concise when an interpreter is 
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present given the extra time it takes to communicate through an interpreter (similar to that 
people are more concise when talking to a hard hearing person, Ewens et al., 2016b). Ewens 
et al. (2016c) found evidence for both. In that study the interpreter implemented a long 
consecutive style of interpretation in which the interpreter translates segments of talk. This 
style is frequently used in real life (Viezzi, 2012), including in intelligence interviews 
(Department of the Army, 2006). Remembering all the details an interviewee conveys is 
difficult in such a situation and the interpreters did not translate about 10% of the details 
given by the interviewees. However, when the interviewees’ text was analysed, it still was the 
case that they provided less detail than interviewees who spoke in their native language 
without an interpreter.  
In Ewens et al. (2016b, c, d) the participants who spoke in their native language 
through an interpreter came from different countries (Republic of Korea, Russia and US) than 
the participants who spoke in their native language without an interpreter (UK). It therefore 
cannot be ruled out that the effect was (in part) caused because of a cultural difference. In the 
present experiment we avoided this possible confound: Participants who spoke through an 
interpreter or spoke without an interpreter came from the same countries and spoke in the 
same languages. Specifically, unlike the previous Ewens et al. studies, half of the participants 
were interviewed by fellow native speakers of that language. 
In ordinary conversations, people never say initially all they know but typically 
provide a summary of their activities, highlighting some core issues (‘I did some shopping in 
the morning, and had a BBQ in the evening’) (Fisher, 2010; Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). This 
is, in part, the result of conversation rules (Fisher, 2010, Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011). 
Through life experience, people learn how much detail is anticipated in conversations. Truth 
tellers realise that in interview settings they have to provide much more information than in 
ordinary conversations but they still do not provide all the information they know (Fisher, 
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2010; Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). One effective way to change truth tellers’ expectations 
about how much information to provide in an interview is to expose them to a detailed model 
statement (MS), which is an example of a detailed account/story unrelated to the topic of the 
interview (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). A MS changes truth tellers’ 
expectations about how much detail is required. As a result, truth tellers exposed to a MS 
provide more detail than truth tellers who have not been exposed to a MS (Bogaard, Meijer, 
& Vrij, 2014; Leal et al., 2015). 
Since interviewees are particularly reluctant to provide all the information they know 
when interviewed through an interpreter, it could be predicted that a MS is an effective 
method in an interpreter interview to get interviewees to say more because there is much 
room for improvement in providing details in such an interview setting. This is indeed what 
Ewens et al. (2016d) found: a MS resulted in additional details provided by interviewees in 
interpreter-present interviews. However, in Ewens et al., the MS was used as a within-
subjects method (all interviewees provided an initial recall, then listened to a MS, and then 
were invited to report again what they had experienced). Since a control group, in which 
interviewees were asked to report their experiences twice without listening to a MS, was 
missing it cannot be ruled out that the additional detail was caused by a factor other than the 
MS. Perhaps mere asking the same question twice leads to more detail. In the present 
experiment MS was introduced as a between-subjects factor (participants were or were not 
exposed to a MS). 
A consistent finding in deception research is that truth tellers typically provide more 
detail than liars (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; DePaulo et al., 2003; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, 
& Herrero, 2005; Oberlader, Naefgen, Koppehele-Gossel, Quinten, Banse, & Schmidt, 2016; 
Vrij, 2008). Reasons for this are that liars lack the imagination and skills to convey the 
amount of detail that truth tellers convey (Vrij, 2008), or are reluctant to provide detail out of 
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fear that such details may provide leads for investigators to check (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2014). A MS not only makes truth tellers aware how detailed they are supposed to be, it also 
makes liars aware of this. The result is that both liars and truth tellers become more detailed 
after being exposed to a MS (Bogaard et al., 2014; Ewens et al., 2016d; Leal et al., 2015). 
Based on these considerations we predicted the following regarding providing detail: 
Interviewees will provide fewer details through an interpreter than without an interpreter, 
particularly when no MS is presented (Interpreter X Model Statement interaction, Hypothesis 
1a); A MS will increase the total amount of detail provided by truth tellers and liars (Model 
Statement main effect, Hypothesis 1b); and Truth tellers will provide more details than liars 
(Veracity main effect, Hypothesis 1c). 
Type of Detail: Complications, Common Knowledge Details and Self-Handicapping 
Strategies 
 Ewens et al. (2016b, c, d) examined ‘total detail’. Although this has been shown to be 
a diagnostic cue to deceit (Amado et al. [2015] found an effect size of d = .55 in their meta-
analysis), it also has shortcomings. First, it is a general cue. This makes it a vague cue and all 
kinds of specific details that reveal deceit are overlooked when examining ‘total detail’. 
Second, there are large individual differences in people’s speech (Nahari & Pazuelo, 2015; 
Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari, in press), therefore cut-off scores -‘If a person provides more 
than an X number of details s/he is likely to be telling the truth, but when the person provides 
less than this number of details s/he is likely to be lying’- will not work. Not being able to 
come up with cut off scores is a known problem in verbal lie detection (Nahari & Vrij, 2015; 
Vrij, 2016). A possible solution is to design ‘within-subjects tools’, that is, being able to 
make a decision about the veracity status of an interviewee by comparing different responses 
made by the same interviewee during a single interview. The development of a verbal within-
7 
Using the Model Statement in Interpreter-based Interviews 
subjects lie detection tool would benefit investigators and they often stress the importance of 
such tools in conversations with academics.  
 In the present experiment we attempted to design a within-subjects tool by 
distinguishing between three types of detail: complications, common knowledge details and 
self-handicapping strategies. Complications have been examined before (in a verbal veracity 
assessment tool called Criteria-Based Content Analysis, criterion 7, Amado et al., 2015; Vrij, 
2008), but common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies are to our knowledge 
new in deception research. We will argue that complications are more likely to occur in 
truthful statements and that common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies are 
more likely to occur in deceptive statements. The within-subjects element is that someone can 
examine the ratio of complications (complications / (complications + common knowledge 
details + self-handicapping strategies) which should be higher for truth tellers than for liars.  
 Complications. 
 ‘Complications’ is anything a person says that complicates the statement. For 
example, if someone says that while driving to his holiday destination he made a brief visit to 
a city that he always wanted to visit, he describes a complicated travel itinerary (it is more 
straightforward to drive directly to the holiday destination). If the person then adds that he 
had a flat tire en route and, that he got lost, and that there was heavy traffic due to a road 
accident he adds three more complications. Complications do not just occur when people 
travel, they occur all the time: ‘The sailing race was cancelled, there was not enough wind’, 
‘When we arrived at the museum it was closed’, ‘Initially we did not see our friend, it 
appeared that he was waiting at a different entrance’. Complications are more likely to occur 
in truthful statements than in deceptive statements, as a meta-analysis of CBCA research 
revealed (Amado et al., 2015). Making up complications requires creative thinking and not 
everyone possesses this skill. In addition, research has shown that liars prefer to ‘keep their 
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stories simple’ (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007) and including many complications 
does not constitute a simple story.  
 Common Knowledge Details.  
 Common knowledge details are related to scripts. A script is a pre-determined, 
stereotyped sequences of actions that defines a well-known situation (Schank & Abelson, 
1977, p. 41) (e.g., ‘John went to a restaurant. He ordered lobster. He paid the check and left’). 
Although this script does not include much detail about what happened (we are not informed 
about what John ate, whether he sat down, who he paid and why he paid) people feel that 
they ‘know’ these facts because they can rely on knowledge encountered in their lives in such 
situations. Several scholars reasoned that liars are more likely to include scripts in their 
statements than truth tellers (Köhnken, 2004; Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014). Truth 
tellers, who have personal experiences of an event, are likely to report such unique 
experiences and when they do this the statement is no longer a script. Liars do not have 
personal experiences of the event they report and then draw upon general knowledge to 
construe the event by using “pointers” to describe the event (Sporer, 2016). In addition, liars 
prefer to keep their stories simple (Hartwig et al., 2007) and a scripted story constitutes a 
simple story. 
 The way deception researchers use the word scripts is perhaps somewhat misleading. 
It stretches beyond Schank and Abelson’s (1977) description as the scripted events they refer 
to do not necessarily involve a sequence of events. In our experiment scripted events did not 
necessarily involve a sequence of events either. Instead, we coded statements as scripted 
when a statement strongly invoked common stereotypical knowledge about everyday events 
(e.g. ‘We went to the National Museum where we spent a few hours’). To avoid confusion 
with scripts, we do not label them as such but call them common knowledge details. 
Self-handicapping strategies. 
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Self-handicapping strategies are justifications people give why they cannot provide 
certain information, for example: “My dad did all the planning”, “Nothing unexpected 
happened, I am a very organised person”, “I can't remember the name of the hotel, it was a 
while ago I was there”, “I can’t remember, I’ve got a poor memory”, “I fell asleep for most of 
the bus journey”. The justification is crucial for a self- handicapping strategy, the statement ‘I 
can’t remember’ itself is not a self-handicapping strategy, it is called ‘admitting lack of 
memory’, which is a CBCA criterion (criterion 15). We use the term self-handicapping 
strategies because the result of these justifications is that the interviewee is not able to give a 
certain piece of information. We expect liars to include more self-handicapping strategies in 
their statements than truth tellers. For liars, who are inclined to keep stories simple, not 
having to provide information seems like an attractive strategy. However, liars are also 
concerned about their credibility and believe that admitting lack of knowledge and/or 
memory appears suspicious (Ruby & Brigham, 1998). A solution is to provide a justification 
for the inability to provide information.  
 The impact of a model statement and interpreter on complications, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. 
 There is evidence that a MS enhances differences in speech between truth tellers and 
liars. In their MS experiment, Leal et al. (2015) found that the difference in plausibility 
between the stories of truth tellers and liars was more pronounced in the MS-present 
condition than in the MS-absent condition. However, Leal et al. did not examine which type 
of detail caused this difference in plausibility.  
A MS may enhance the difference between truth tellers and liars in terms of 
complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. A MS is likely 
to increase complications. These are the kind of detail that interviewees are likely to leave out 
when describing key aspects of activities as complications are often peripheral elements of a 
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story and a story often makes perfect sense and is easily understood without reporting 
complications. In the example given above, all sorts of complications that happen en route to 
a holiday destination are not key aspects of a story when describing the travel to the holiday 
destination, thus truth tellers may leave them out when they are not exposed to a MS. Since 
liars either lack the creativity to make up complications or are reluctant to provide them in 
order to keep their story simple, the increase in complications as a result of a MS is more 
likely to occur in truth tellers than in liars. This results in more pronounced differences 
between truth tellers and liars in the MS-present condition than in the MS-absent condition. 
 A MS may have an opposite effect on truth tellers and liars regarding common 
knowledge details. A MS could make truth tellers to provide fewer common knowledge 
details as they may fill their scripted stories with further experienced details. Since liars are 
less able or willing to add extra information to their scripted descriptions of events, they may 
report some extra scripted events to fulfill the expectation to be more detailed. The result is 
that the difference in common knowledge details between truth tellers and liars will be more 
pronounced in the MS-present condition than in the MS-absent condition.  
A MS may also have an opposite effect on truth tellers and liars regarding self-
handicapping strategies. Liars feel the pressure to say more when exposed to a MS and may 
decide to add some self-handicapping strategies to justify why they cannot give too many 
additional details. Truth tellers, who will be more inclined to tell it all when exposed to a MS, 
may add information where possible which makes a statement no longer a self-handicapping 
strategy (My dad planned the trip, but I told him what I wanted to see.).  
A MS could result in truth tellers admitting lack of memory (‘I forgot the street 
name’) but this is not a self-handicapping strategy as long as no justification is given for the 
lack of memory. Since truth tellers are less inclined than liars to believe that admitting lack of 
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memory sounds dishonest, there is no reason to assume that they will provide such 
justifications.  
We explored the effect of an interpreter on complications, common knowledge details 
and self- handicapping strategies. This is an empirically relevant question and we cannot rule 
out that the presence of an interpreter has an effect. That is, perhaps interviewees are inclined 
to be more concise in the presence of an interpreter, which could result in fewer 
complications and more common knowledge details. Or perhaps interpreters leave out 
complications and replace them with common knowledge details in their translations. Or 
perhaps a combination of both processes will occur.  
 Hypotheses regarding complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies. 
 Based on the considerations described above we formulated the following hypotheses: 
Across both MS-present and MS-absent conditions, compared to liars, truth tellers will 
include in their statements more complications (Hypothesis 2a), fewer common knowledge 
details (Hypothesis 2b) and fewer self-handicapping strategies (Hypothesis 2c).  
 A MS will increase the number of complications in a statement (Hypothesis 3), but 
will not have an effect on common knowledge details or self-handicapping strategies, due to 
the expected opposite effect of a MS on truth tellers and liars for these cues. 
Since the MS is expected to enlarge the differences between truth tellers and liars, we 
therefore expected that the effects predicted in Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c would be stronger 
in the MS-present than in the MS-absent condition, and we thus predicted that particularly in 
the MS-present condition truth tellers will include more complications (Hypothesis 4a), fewer 
common knowledge details (Hypothesis 4b) and fewer self-handicapping strategies 
(Hypothesis 4c) than liars.  
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We derived our final hypothesis from Hypothesis 4: The ratio of complications will 
be higher in truth tellers than in liars (Hypothesis 5a), particularly in the MS-present 
condition (Hypothesis 5b).   
Method 
Participants 
A total of 199 participants (44 males, 153 females and two unknown) took part in the 
study. Their age ranged from 18-38 years with an average age of M = 21.55 years (SD = 
2.82). Participation took place in three different universities in the Republic of Korea, Russia 
and USA, and the background of the participants was Korean (n = 80), Russian (n = 80) and 
Hispanic (n = 39).  
Procedure 
 Recruitment, pre-condition selection form, preparation and pre-interview 
questionnaire.  
 Participants were recruited via an advert on the university intranets and advertisement 
leaflets. The advert explained that the experiment would require participants to tell the truth 
or lie about a trip away that they may (or may not) have taken within the last year. We 
decided upon ‘last year’ so that truth tellers would still remember many details about their 
trip and liars could not easily say ‘I can’t remember’ when answering the questions.  On 
arrival to the corresponding university, participants were given a participant information 
sheet and signed an informed consent form. They were then given a pre-condition selection 
form to complete on which six cities were listed the researchers thought the participants may 
have visited during the last twelve months (different cities were used for the three different 
countries). There were also two blank lines on the form on which the participant could write 
down which cities other than the ones listed on the form they have visited during the last 
twelve months.  
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For each city they indicated i) whether they have been there during the last twelve 
months, ii) when they have been there during the last twelve months, iii) for how long they 
stayed there, and iv) whether they have lived there. For truth tellers the experimenter selected 
a city where the participant had stayed during the last twelve months for at least two nights 
but never has lived in. The very few participants who were allocated to the truth teller 
condition but who did not fulfil these criteria were allocated to the deception condition. For 
liars, the experimenter selected a city where the participant had never been before. The cities 
liars discussed were matched with the cities the truth tellers discussed. In total, truth tellers 
discussed more than twenty cities, and liars discussed most of these cities.  
Truth tellers were informed that they would be interviewed about city ‘X’ and asked 
to answer the questions truthfully. Liars were informed that they would be interviewed about 
city ‘X’ and that they had to pretend to have stayed there for at least two nights during a trip 
made during the last twelve months. Truth tellers and liars were then left with a computer 
with internet access and told they had twenty minutes to prepare for their interview, or to let 
the experimenter know if they were ready before that time. They were told that they were 
allowed to make notes while doing their research. Truth tellers and liars were told that it was 
important to be convincing because, if they did not appear convincing, they would be asked 
to write a statement about what they told the interviewer in the interview. In a pre-interview 
questionnaire the truth tellers and liars rated their thoroughness of preparation via three items: 
(1) shallow to (7) thorough; (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The 
answers to the three questions were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .87) and the variable is 
called ‘thoroughness’. They were also asked the following question: ‘Do you think the 
amount of time you were given to prepare was: (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient. We also 
asked in an open-ended question how they had prepared themselves.  
Eight experimental conditions. 
14 
Using the Model Statement in Interpreter-based Interviews 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the eight experimental cells. A total of 
99 participants were allocated to the truth condition and 100 to the lie condition; 100 to the 
Model Statement absent condition and 99 to the Model Statement present condition; and 99 
to the Interpreter absent condition and 100 to the Interpreter present condition. Individual cell 
sizes varied from 24 (one cell) to 25 (the seven other cells).  
In total, three interpreters were used in the study, one in each country. The Korean 
and Hispanic interpreters were professional interpreters; the Russian interpreter spoke fluent 
English and had a Masters degree, which included English language. The Korean and 
Russian interpreters had worked for us before. The interpreters used a long consecutive 
interpreter style (they interpreted chunks of information uttered by the participant rather than 
interpreting sentence by sentence) and took notes during the interview.  
 In the interpreter condition, one British interviewer was used, whereas in the non-
interpreter condition one Russian, one Korean and one Hispanic interviewer were used. Prior 
to the experiment the British interviewer (who is a very experienced interviewer and has 
interviewed in many experiments before) instructed the other interviewers how to interview. 
They were asked to be friendly and not to interrupt the interviewee and to ask the six 
questions listed on the standardised interview protocol in the order mentioned on the 
protocol.  Several practice sessions took place until the British interviewer was satisfied with 
the interview style of the interviewer. That is, she was satisfied with the demeanour of the 
interviewers (appeared friendly) and the opportunities they gave to the interviewees to talk 
(no interruptions and no quick continuation with the next question when the interviewee 
stopped talking).  To assess consistency in interview style between the interpreter and non-
interpreter conditions, participants were asked to assess in a post-questionnaire the rapport 
they experienced with the interviewer (see below).  
 The interview. 
15 
Using the Model Statement in Interpreter-based Interviews 
Prior to the interview the experimenter told the interviewer about which city to 
interview the participant. The interviewer was unaware of the veracity status of the 
participant. To make the interviewee feel comfortable and to avoid floor effects in 
establishing rapport interviewees were offered a glass of water from the interviewer, as 
offering something helps rapport building (reciprocation principle, Cialdini, 2007).  
The interviewer started by saying: “I understand from my colleague that you have 
visited _________ I would now like to ask you some questions about this visit.” In the Model 
Statement present condition the interviewer continued: “Before I do so I would like to play 
you a model statement to give you an idea how much detail I like you to include in your 
responses.” An audiotaped model statement was then played. It was 1.30 minutes long and 
unrelated to a holiday trip, as we wanted to give participants an idea about what a detailed 
account entails rather than to give them an idea about what they actually could say during the 
interview. In the initial recording (Leal et al., 2015) a person gives a detailed account of 
attending a motor racing event. The recording was a spontaneous, unscripted, recall of an 
event, truly experienced by the person, and the only instruction each person received was to 
be as detailed as possible (for a transcript of the recording please contact the first author). The 
recording was subsequently audio-recorded in Russian, Korean and Hispanic by native 
speakers and the participant listened to the model statement in his/her own native language. 
After the MS the interviewer continued: “I am going to ask you some questions and 
before responding to each question I would like you to bear in mind the amount of detail 
given in the statement you just heard and please try and provide a similar amount of detail in 
your responses.”  
The interview contained six questions, including: “Please tell me in as much detail as 
possible everything you did when you were at _________ from the moment you arrived to 
the moment you left” (Question 1); “Tell me in as much detail as possible about your 
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accommodation where you stayed, including the location and address if you can remember, 
and what (tourist) attractions were nearby?” (Question 3), “Tell me in as much detail as 
possible everything you did to plan this trip? E.g. organising transport, accommodation, 
where to visit and so on.” (Question 4), and “Can you tell me in as much detail as possible if 
there was anything unexpected that happened or perhaps something that didn’t go to plan 
when organising this trip?” (Question 6). A copy of the full interview protocol is available 
from the first author. In the MS-present condition the participant was for each question 
reminded about the MS in the following way: e.g. “Remembering the model statement, Please 
tell me in as much detail as possible everything you did when you were at _________ from 
the moment you arrived to the moment you left” (Question 1). 
The interviews were video (interviewees only) and audio recorded and the English 
speech in the audiotapes was subsequently transcribed. In other words, in the interpreter 
conditions the speech from the interpreter was transcribed. We did this because it is this 
speech that interviewers will understand in real life interviews with interpreters. In a study in 
which in the interpreter present interviews both the interviewee’s and interpreter’s speech 
were both transcribed, coded and analysed, virtual identical findings in the two data sets 
emerged in terms of eliciting information and cues to deceit (Ewens et al., 2016c). 
Post-interview questionnaire. 
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire, which was 
translated and completed in the native language of the participant. The questionnaire 
measured motivation to perform well during the interview (measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 = not at all motivated to 5 = very motivated) and likelihood of writing a 
statement (on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = totally). They were also 
asked the extent to which they told the truth during the interview on an 11 point Likert scale 
ranging from 0% to 100%. 
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Rapport was measured via the nine items Interaction Questionnaire (Vallano & 
Schreiber Compo, 2011).  Participants rated the interviewer on 7-point scales ranging from 
[1] not at all to [7] extremely on nine characteristics such as ‘smooth’, ‘bored’, ‘engrossed’, 
and ‘involved’ (Cronbach’s alpha = .81). The participants were finally asked to write down 
how they had prepared themselves for the interview.  
Coding 
All coders were blind to the hypotheses and Veracity condition. 
 Detail.  
 The coders were taught the coding scheme by the first author who has twenty years of 
experience in coding detail. A coder first read the transcripts and coded each detail in the 
interview. To give an example, the answer ‘Where I went to everything was nearby. The 
Space Center was near that hotel, like 10-11 minutes away. It was close to the hotel and the 
mall too. The only thing that was not was the aquarium. It was… that one was more towards 
downtown Houston’ contained eleven details. Each detail was only coded once, thus 
repetitions were not coded. A second coder coded a random sample of 50 transcripts. Inter-
rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects model measuring 
consistency, was high (Single Measures ICC = .87). 
 Two coders coded independently from each other complications, common knowledge 
details and self- handicapping strategies. Three examples of complications are: i) ‘Generally, 
we were about to miss the performance because of me, because they have another time there, 
an hour gain or lose, something like that’; ii) ‘The bus arrived three hours too early in 
Moscow’; and iii) ‘The fact is that there are no places to visit in the town itself, you have to 
drive away’.  Three examples of common knowledge details are: i) ‘We drank a lot during 
the flight and when the guys met us we continued to drink walking in the city’; ii) ‘They 
showed us the houses and told us something about them’; iii) ‘We tried to absorb as much of 
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this cultural layer as we could’. Three examples of self-handicapping strategies are: i) ‘I 
usually have everything quite strictly planned so in my life unexpected things happen rarely; 
ii) ‘I did not organise anything, our trips are always planned by dad’; iii) ‘I did not plan 
anything, I trusted my aunt because she lives in this city and knows it very well’.   
 Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency, was high for complications (Average Measures, Intraclass 
correlation coefficient, ICC = .95) and self-handicapping strategies (Average Measures ICC = 
.85) and satisfactory for common knowledge details (Average Measures ICC = .64). 
Disagreements were resolved between the two coders. All disagreements occurred because 
one coder missed a cue. To calculate the ratio of complications a total score was computed 
(number of complications + number of common knowledge details + number of self-
handicapping strategies) and the number of complications was divided by this total score. 
Thus, a transcript with five complications, three common knowledge details and no self-
handicapping strategies received a score of .625. Scores > .50 indicate that the participants 
reported more complications than common knowledge details or self-handicapping strategies, 
whereas scores < .50 indicate that the participants reported more common knowledge details 
or self-handicapping strategies than complications. 
 Open ended questions.  
 One coder read the answers of the participants about their preparation and came up 
with thirteen distinctive categories and a miscellaneous category. She explained the coding 
scheme to two coders who allocated the participants’ answers to the categories. The inter-
rater reliability between the two coders was good, Kappa = .78. The coders discussed the 
cases in which they disagreed. These discussions always resulted in a mutual agreement for 
these cases. 
Results 
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Preparation  
 A oneway ANOVA with Veracity as factor and thoroughness as dependent variable 
revealed that truth tellers (M = 4.84, SD = 1.26, 95% CI [4.60, 5.08]) rated their preparation 
as more thorough than liars (M = 4.49, SD = 1.17, 95% CI [4.25, 4.73]), F(1, 197) = 4.11, p = 
.044, d = 0.29. In total 20.2% of truth tellers and 28.0% of liars rated their preparation as ‘not 
thorough’ (score of 1 to 3 on the 7-point Likert scale). Truth tellers (M = 6.04, SD = 1.26, 
95% CI [5.74, 6.34]) also believed more than liars (M = 4.92, SD = 1.72, 95% CI [4.62, 
5.22]), that they were given sufficient time to prepare themselves for the interview, F(1, 197) 
= 27.51, p < .001, d = 0.75. In total 5.1% of truth tellers and 22% of liars thought that they 
were given insufficient preparation time for the interview (score of 1 to 3 on the 7-point 
Likert scale). We introduced thoroughness and preparation time as covariates in the 
hypotheses testing analyses.  
 The open-ended answers revealed that many truth tellers (n = 59) relied on their 
memory, feelings and photos they took. Two other answers frequently reported were looking 
at maps (n = 10) and looking at hotels and tourist sites (n = 10). 
 The activities of liars were somewhat more diverse than those of truth tellers, and 
activities frequently mentioned were looking at hotels and tourist sites (n = 19), looking at 
maps (n = 14), thinking about how such a trip would go (e.g. length, transportation, costs, n = 
11), and looking at types of food specialities and food reviews of the city (n = 10). 
Manipulation Checks 
 Rapport.  
 An ANOVA with Interpreter as factor and rapport as dependent variable did not show 
a difference in rapport between the two conditions, F(1, 197) = 0.31, p = .579, d = 0.07.  The 
grand mean revealed that the interviewees perceived the rapport with the interviewer as very 
good by the participants (M = 5.56, SD = .81 on a 7-point scale). 
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Motivation, likelihood of receiving a penalty, number of days discussed in the 
report, time since the trip was made and percentage truth telling in the interview.  
The grand mean showed that the participants were motivated to perform well (M = 
3.98, SD = .64 on a 5-point scale). A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Model Statement) X 2 (Interpreter) 
ANOVA revealed no significant main or interaction effects, all F’s < 1.20, all p’s > .27. Liars 
(M = 4.02, SD = 1.60, 95% CI [3.60, 4.20]) were more convinced that they would have to 
write a statement than truth tellers (M = 3.45, SD = 1.52, 95% CI [3.15, 3.76]), F(1, 191) = 
4.27, p = .040, d = 0.37. All the other effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.54, all p’s > .21. 
Those interviewed without an interpreter discussed on average more days away in their 
interview (M = 4.57, SD = 5.32, 95% CI [3.88, 5.68]) than those interviewed with an 
interpreter, (M = 3.18, SD = 1.62, 95% CI [2.57,4.37]), F(1, 191) = 4.11, p = .044, d = 0.40. 
All the other effects were not significant, all F’s < 0.63, all p’s > .42. We included ‘the 
number of days discussed’ as a covariate in the hypotheses testing analyses. Since we did not 
predict any effects for nationality of the participants but wanted to control for possible effects 
of this factor, we also included ‘nationality’ as a covariate in the hypotheses testing analyses. 
Truth tellers were asked on the pre-condition selection form when they made the trip 
they discussed. On average this trip was made M = 5. 74 months prior to the interview (SD  = 
3.33). This variable was not correlated with any of the main dependent variables in the study 
(detail, complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies or ratio of 
complications), all r’s < .17, all p’s > .10). 
Truth tellers told the truth significantly more (M = 94.75, SD = 10.23, 95% CI 
[91.01,98.47]) than liars (M = 20.40, SD = 24.74, 95% CI [16.69,24.10]), F(1, 191) = 777.84, 
p < .001, d = 4.25). All the other effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.32, all p’s > .13 
Hypothesis Testing 
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 All Ms, SDs and CIs related to significant Veracity main effects and significant 
Veracity X Model Statement interaction effects are reported in Table 1 and all Ms, SDs and 
CIs related to significant Model Statement main effects are reported in Table 2. 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Total detail (Hypothesis 1).  
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Model Statement) X 2 (Interpreter) ANCOVA was conducted 
with detail as the dependent variable and ‘thoroughness’, ‘preparation time’, ‘nationality’, 
and ‘number of days discussed during the interview’ as covariates. Significant main effects 
emerged for Veracity, F(1, 187) = 12.41, p < .001, d = .52 and Model Statement, F(1, 187) = 
12.73, p < .001, d = .54. All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.88, all p’s > .09. 
Truth tellers provided more details than liars, supporting Hypothesis 1c, and participants 
exposed to the MS provided more details than those not exposed to the MS, supporting 
Hypothesis 1b.  
In Hypothesis 1a we predicted a specific type of interaction between Interpreter and 
Model Statement. In alignment with Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2011) and Shaw et al. (2015) 
we believe that this justifies further examination of the data, specifically examining the 
difference between the two interpreter conditions in the two Model Statement conditions 
separately, as this addresses Hypothesis 1a. Follow up analyses revealed that in the MS-
absent condition, participants without an interpreter provided more details than participants 
with an interpreter, F(1, 94) = 4.72, p = .032, d = .48. In the MS-present condition, 
participants without an interpreter provided a similar amount of details as participants with an 
interpreter, F(1, 93) = 0.626, p = .431, d = .16. This pattern of results supports Hypothesis 1a. 
Complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
(Hypotheses 2 - 4).  
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Three 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Model Statement) X 2 (Interpreter) ANCOVAs were 
conducted with complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
as the dependent variables and ‘thoroughness’, ‘preparation time’, ‘nationality’ and ‘number 
of days discussed during the interview’ as covariates. For complications, significant main 
effects for Veracity, F(1, 187) = 19.07, p < .001, d = .73 and Model Statement, F(1, 187) = 
10.95, p = .001, d = .63, and a significant Veracity X Model Statement interaction effect 
emerged, F(1, 187) = 6.15, p = .014, partial eta2 = .032. All other effects were not 
significant, all F’s < 2.21, all p’s > .13. Truth tellers included more complications in their 
statements than liars, supporting Hypothesis 2a. Participants included more complications in 
the MS-present condition than in the MS-absent condition, supporting Hypothesis 3.  
Regarding the Veracity X Model Statement interaction, in the MS-absent condition, 
truth tellers included more complications in their statements than liars, F(1, 94) = 8.57, p = 
.004, d = .66.  Also in the MS-present condition, truth tellers included more complications in 
their statements than liars, F(1, 93) = 12.52, p < .001, d = .92. The effect was stronger in the 
MS-present condition, which supports Hypothesis 4a. 
For common knowledge details, significant main effects for Veracity, F(1, 187) = 
5.49, p =.02, d = .48 and Interpreter, F(1, 187) = 4.63, p = .033, d = .32, and a significant 
Veracity X Model Statement interaction effect emerged, F(1, 187) = 4.23, p = .041, partial 
eta2 = .022. All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 0.17, all p’s > .68. Liars included 
more common knowledge details in their statements than truth tellers, supporting Hypothesis 
2b. Unexpectedly, participants interviewed without an interpreter included more common 
knowledge details in their statements (M = 3.53, SD = 2.30, 95% CI [3.08, 3.96]) than 
participants interviewed with an interpreter (M = 2.79, SD = 2.32, 95% CI [2.36, 3.23.70]).  
Regarding the Veracity X Model Statement interaction, in the Model Statement absent 
condition, truth tellers and liars included a similar amount of common knowledge details in 
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their transcripts, F(1, 94) = 0.10, p = .747, d = .23.  In the MS-present condition, truth tellers 
included fewer common knowledge details in their statements than liars, F(1, 93) = 7.51, p = 
.007, d = .75. This supports Hypothesis 4b. 
For self-handicapping strategies, significant main effects for Veracity, F(1, 187) = 
21.94, p < .001, d = .78 and Interpreter, F(1, 189) = 4.60, p = .033, d = .29 emerged, whereas 
all other effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.33, all p’s > .12. Truth tellers included fewer 
self-handicapping strategies in their statements than liars1, supporting Hypothesis 2c. 
Unexpectedly, participants interviewed without an interpreter included more self- 
handicapping strategies in their statements (M = 0.63, SD = 0.86, 95% CI [0.48, 0.77]) than 
participants interviewed with an interpreter (M = 0.41, SD = 0.67, 95% CI [0.26, 0.55]). Since 
the Veracity X Model Statement interaction was not significant, Hypothesis 4c was rejected. 
Ratio of complications (Hypothesis 5).  
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Model Statement) X 2 (Interpreter) ANCOVA was conducted 
with the ratio of complications as dependent variable and ‘thoroughness’, ‘preparation time’, 
‘nationality’ and ‘number of days discussed during the interview’ as covariates. The analysis 
revealed significant main effects for Veracity, F(1, 187) = 50.59, p < .001, d = 1.12 and 
Model Statement, F(1, 187) = 4.54, p = .034, d = .29, and significant effects for the Veracity 
X Model Statement interaction effect, F(1, 187) = 4.21, p = .042, partial eta2 = .022, and the 
Veracity X Interpreter interaction effect, F(1, 187) = 3.99, p = .047, partial eta2 = .021. All 
other effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.81, all p’s > .181. Truth tellers obtained a higher 
ratio of complications in their statements than liars, which supports Hypothesis 5a. These 
ratios showed that, on average, truth tellers included more complications and liars fewer 
complications in their statements than common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies. Participants included a higher ratio of complications in the MS-present condition 
than in the MS-absent condition. 
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Regarding the Veracity X Model Statement interaction, in the MS-absent condition, 
truth tellers included a higher ratio of complications in their statements than liars, F(1, 94) = 
13.53, p < .001, d = .82.  Also in the MS-present condition, truth tellers included a higher 
ratio of complications in their statements than liars, F(1, 93) = 34.18, p < .001, d = 1.56. The 
effect was the strongest in the MS-present condition, and, as the d-score (1.56) and as mean 
scores in Table 1 indicate, very substantial in the MS-present condition. These findings 
support Hypothesis 5b. 
Regarding the Veracity X Interpreter interaction, in the Interpreter absent condition, 
truth tellers (M = 0.67, SD = 0.28, 95% CI [0.60, 0.74]) obtained a higher ratio of 
complications than liars (M = 0.46, SD = 0.24, 95% CI [0.39, 0.53]), F(1, 93) = 12.25, p < 
.001, d = .81; and also in the Interpreter present condition, truth tellers (M = 0.77, SD = 0.21, 
95% CI [0.70, 0.83]) obtained a higher ratio of complications than liars (M = 0.42, SD = 0.27, 
95% CI [0.35, 0.49]), F(1, 94) = 36.75, p < .001, d = 1.43. The effect was the strongest in the 
Interpreter present condition. 
Discriminant Analyses. 
Table 3 about here 
We tested the utility of the model statement for eliciting cues to deceit and focused on 
two main dependent variables: the within-subjects variable ‘ratio of complications’ and the 
between-subjects variable ‘total detail’. First, we ran discriminant analyses for the i) MS-
absent and ii) MS-present conditions separately. In each case, the objective group belonging 
(truthful versus deceptive) was the classifying variable and the predictor was the ratio of 
complications or details. We then ran four additional discriminant analyses in which we made 
a further distinction into Interpreter-absent and Interpreter-present conditions. We did this for 
ratio of complications and also for total details. All the relevant statistical information is 
provided in Table 3. 
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In the MS-absent condition (the two interpreter conditions combined), 66% of truth 
tellers and 68% of liars (67% total accuracy rate) were classified correctly. In the MS-present 
condition (again the two interpreter conditions combined) 80% of truth tellers and 78% of 
liars (79% total accuracy rate) were classified correctly. In other words, the MS-present 
condition obtained better results than the MS-absent condition, which supports Hypothesis 
5b.  
A further distinction into Interpreter-absent and Interpreter-present conditions 
revealed that the pattern just described held true in both interpreter conditions: Truth tellers 
and liars were classified more accurately in the MS-present than in the MS-absent conditions. 
The discriminant analyses further revealed that the accuracy rates were somewhat higher in 
the interpreter-present than in interpreter-absent conditions. 
The results for the ‘total detail’ variable showed that this variable was less effective in 
correctly classifying truth tellers and liars than the ‘ratio of complications’ variable. The 
findings for the two interpreter conditions were similar, at least as far as the total accuracy 
rates are concerned.   
Discussion 
In the MS-absent condition, statements obtained in the interpreter present interviews 
contained fewer details than statements obtained in the interpreter absent interviews, whereas 
in the MS-present condition, interpreter absent and interpreter present interviews contained a 
similar amount of detail. This supports Hypothesis 1a, replicates previous research (Ewens et 
al., 2016d), and shows that interpreter-based interviews lead to less information but that this 
can be prevented by introducing a MS in such interviews.  
The finding that in MS-absent interviews, the presence of an interpreter leads to less 
information is unfortunate as eliciting information is the core of an investigative interview 
(Fisher, 2010). A positive finding, however, is that in terms of lie detection, the presence of 
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an interpreter had no effect, as the ratio of complications was higher for truth tellers than for 
liars regardless of whether an interpreter was present or absent. Being able to discriminate 
between truth tellers and liars is another important aspect of investigative interviewing 
(Loftus, 2011). The difference between truth tellers and liars in the ratio of complications was 
somewhat more pronounced in the interpreter present condition than in the interpreter absent 
condition, a finding that we cannot explain, but it clearly shows that ratio of complications is 
a diagnostic cue to distinguish truth tellers from liars in both interpreter present and 
interpreter absent interviews.   
Exposing participants to a MS showed, other than nullifying the negative effect of 
having an interpreter on eliciting details, two more important advantages in the present 
experiment. First, it resulted in more details. Other mnemonics have been found to lead to 
additional detail after free recall, for example context reinstatement (Colwell, Hiscock-
Anisman, & Fede, 2013; Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon, 2002) but the benefit of a MS is that it 
is easy to implement in real life because the only task for the interviewer is to switch on the 
MS audiotape. A MS works better than a request ‘to be as detailed as possible’ (Leal et al., 
2015), probably because a MS gives interviewees an example of what to do, whereas a verbal 
request to be detailed is just an instruction. It is easier to learn from examples than from 
verbal instructions. Although a MS resulted in more details it did not result in better 
discrimination between truth tellers and liars based on ‘total details’ as both truth tellers and 
liars reported more details after listening to the MS. This effect, a MS results in more details 
from both truth tellers and liars and, hence, not in a better discrimination between these two 
groups, replicates previous MS deception research (Bogaard et al., 2014; Ewens et al., 2016d; 
Leal et al., 2015).  
Second, exposure to a MS research facilitated lie detection as the differences between 
truth tellers and liars in terms of complications, common knowledge details and ratio of 
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complications were more pronounced in the MS-present than in the MS-absent conditions. 
Thus, although a MS make both truth tellers and liars to report more details, it is the type of 
detail they additionally report that distinguishes the two groups. This is similar to Leal et al. 
(2015) who found that a MS did not enhance lie detection based on ‘total detail’ but did 
enhance lie detection based on the plausibility of these additional details.  
A MS raises interviewees’ expectations about how much detail is required in an 
interview. This could also result in some social pressure on truth tellers to provide more 
detail. Since people strategically regulate memory output balancing correct detail and 
confidence (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), this could lead to interviewees feeling pressure to 
provide details about which they are less confident that they are accurate, and that could lead 
to providing incorrect information. Our research paradigm does not allow us to test this 
hypothesis, because for this hypothesis ground truth is required about the events the 
interviewee describes, but future research should examine this important question.  
Truth tellers and liars differed from each other in reporting complications, common 
knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies, and in the ratio of complications 
reported. Although complications have been examined before (as part of the CBCA tool, 
Amado et al., 2015; Vrij, 2008), the other three variables are new in deception research. 
Common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies are interesting as these are ‘cues 
to deceit’ (liars report them more often than truth tellers), whereas ‘detail’ and 
‘complications’ are ‘cues to truthfulness’ (truth tellers report them more often than liars). In 
verbal lie detection tools, virtually all verbal cues that are examined are ‘cues to truthfulness’. 
For example, in CBCA, all 19 verbal cues are cues to truthfulness, and in Reality Monitoring 
(RM), all cues except one are cues to truthfulness (Amado et al., 2015: Masip et al., 2005; 
Oberlader et al., 2016). The only cue to deceit in RM – cognitive operations- does not 
discriminate particularly well between truth tellers and liars (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008).  
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The benefit of having a mixture of cues to truthfulness and cues to deceit is that a 
within-subjects score can be calculated (the ratio of cues to truthfulness can be calculated), 
with the expectation that truth tellers will obtain a higher ratio of cues to truthfulness than 
liars. That happened in the present experiment. On average, truth tellers included more cues 
to truthfulness in their statements (.72) than liars (.44), whereby a .50 score represents an 
exact balance between cues to truthfulness and cues to deceit. This within-subjects score was 
the most powerful discriminator between truths and lies in the current experiment, and is 
something practitioners are asking for. The difference in ratio of complications was 
substantial, particularly in the MS-present condition (d = 1.56). It is too premature to draw 
conclusions on a single study but the results show that examining the ratio of complications 
in MS-present interviews has clear potential for lie detection purposes (it also resulted in 
correct classification rates of 80% of truth tellers and 78% of liars).  
To properly examine complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies it is important to use deception scenarios in which participants report 
self-generated truths and self-generated lies, so that these cues will appear spontaneously. In 
most deception research, truth tellers (and sometimes liars) are instructed to carry out specific 
tasks or to watch a film and to subsequently report their experiences. The limitation of such 
designs is that the number of complications is then determined by the stimulus material 
(straightforward tasks or watching a film do not generate many complications). This could 
well be the reason why complications are only weakly related to deception in CBCA research 
(Vrij, 2008), as in most of that research truths (and lies) are not self-generated.  
Methodological Considerations 
 Four methodological issue merit attention. First, in the experiment truth tellers were 
given the opportunity to prepare themselves. We gave then this opportunity to avoid creating 
a confound between veracity and preparation, as we also gave liars the opportunity to prepare 
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themselves. Although asking truth tellers to prepare themselves increased the robustness of 
the experimental design someone may argue that this is not realistic as in real life truth tellers 
are unlikely to prepare themselves. We believe that the advantage of the experimental 
robustness outweighs this disadvantage, also because good interviewing involves giving 
interviewees plenty of opportunity to think about the event they are interviewed about 
(Fisher, 2010). In fact, this is what truth tellers did during their preparation: Most of them 
indicated that during the preparation they relied on their memories, feelings and photos they 
took. Neither did truth tellers give the impression that they needed much preparation: They 
rated their preparation as more thorough than liars (despite liars generally putting more effort 
into their preparations (Granhag, Hartwig, Mac Giolla, & Clemens, 2015) and fewer truth 
tellers than liars thought that they were given insufficient preparation time for the interview. 
Thoroughness of preparation and perceptions of the preparation time were included as 
covariates in the analyses and could thus not have affected the results.  
 Second, we cannot check whether the participants were actually telling the truth or 
lying. This is inherent to self-generated truths and lies and, again, we believe that the benefits 
of such truths and lies, described above, outweigh this disadvantage. We asked participants in 
the post-questionnaire to indicate honestly how much they told the truth during the interview 
and truth tellers indicated that they overwhelmingly did (95%). We have no reason to distrust 
this self-reported percentage. Interestingly, liars also reported to have told the truth to some 
extent (20%), which is in alignment with the deception literature, which revealed that liars 
prefer to embed their lies in truthful experiences (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013). 
 Third, we asked questions about both the planning and the execution of the trip but did 
not made a distinction between these two types of question. It could be interesting to examine 
these types of question separately. Liars typically expect questions about the execution but not 
the planning of a trip, and planning questions typically reveal the most cues to deceit 
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(Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 2013a, b; Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps, & 
Vrij, 2013). For example, Knieps et al. (2013a) found that truth tellers’ answers about 
planning were longer, more detailed, more plausible and clearer than liars’ answers, whereas 
no difference emerged between truth tellers and liars when answering the questions about the 
execution of the intentions. To examine this issue fairly, an interview protocol needs to be 
designed that results in answers to the planning and execution questions which are of similar 
length. Future research could deal with this. 
 A final point is that making a trip is arguably a somewhat scripted activity, which makes 
common knowledge details likely to occur. The question arises whether common knowledge 
details also occur when liars describe more unique events. This is a relevant question for future 
research.  
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Table 1. Ms, SDs and CIs as a Function of Veracity (Main effect) and Veracity X Model Statement (Interaction 
effect) 
 
 Truth  Lie 
 M SD 95% CI  M SD 95% CI 
 
Total detail 
 
352.97 290.95 311.79,397.92   244.69 123.62 201.09,286.77  
Complications 
 
11.13 13.10 9.30,13.06   4.77 4.42 2.91,6.65  
Complications-
MS-absent 
 
7.72 6.78 5.64,8.80   4.14 3.97 2.54,5.70  
Complications-
MS-present 
 
15.14 16.47 5.64,8.80   5.40 4.78 2.54,5.70  
Common 
knowledge 
details 
2.61 2.17 2.14,3.01   3.71 2.37 3.30,4.18 
 
 
Common 
knowledge 
details –  
MS-absent 
 
2.94 2.26 2.35,3.61   3.48 2.32 2.81,4.07  
Common 
knowledge 
details –  
MS-present 
 
2.26 2.03 1.54,2.80   3.94 2.44 3.41,4.65  
SHS 0.24 0.52 0.09,0.38   0.79 0.89 0.65,0.94  
          
Ratio of 
complications 
 
0.72 0.25 0.67,0.77   0.44 0.25 0.39,0.49  
Ratio of 
complications- 
MS-absent 
 
0.64 0.25 0.57,0.71   0.43 0.26 0.37,0.51  
Ratio of 
complications- 
MS-present 
0.80 0.22 0.72,0.86   0.44 0.24 0.38,0.52  
          
Note: MS means model statement and SHS means Self-Handicapping Strategies  
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Table 2. Ms, SDs and CIs as a Function of Model Statement (Main effect) and Model Statement X Interpreter 
(interaction effect) 
 
 MS-present  MS-absent 
 M SD  95% CI  M SD 95% CI 
 
Total detail 
 
356.58 276.35 314.82,400.91   241.12 150.59 198.09,283.74  
Total detail –
interpreter 
absent 
 
378.27 338.46 301.92,461.40   275.52 178.86 231.66,314.90  
Total detail – 
interpreter 
present 
 
335.32 198.96 253.07,410.92   206.72 106.82 167.34,250.58  
Complications 10.22 12.97 8.39,12.15   5.67 5.74 3.82,7.55  
          
Ratio of 
complications 
0.62 0.29 0.56,0.67   0.54 0.28 0.48,0.60  
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Table 3. The results of the discriminant analyses.  
 Truth % Lie % Total % X2(1) Wilk’s 
Lambda 
p Canonical 
correlation 
RATIO OF COMPLICATIONS 
MS-absent: Ratio of 
complications 
66 68 67 15.55 0.85 < .001 .38 
MS-Present: Ratio of 
complications 
80 78 79 44.13 0.63 < .001 .61 
INTERPRETER-ABSENT       
MS-absent: Ratio of 
complications 
56 68 62 5.85 .884 .016 .34 
MS-Present: Ratio of 
complications 
75 76 77.5 11.64 .78 .001 .47 
INTERPRETER-PRESENT       
MS-absent: Ratio of 
complications 
64 76 70 10.07 .809 .002 .44 
MS-Present: Ratio of 
complications 
88 80 84 34.90 .480 < .001 .72 
TOTAL DETAIL 
MS-absent: Detail 50 76 63 8.28 0.92 .004 .29 
MS-present: Detail 43 70 56.5 5.77 0.94 .016 .24 
INTERPRETER-ABSENT       
MS-absent: Detail 56 72 64 3.38 .931 .066 .26 
MS-present: Detail 33 80 56.5 3.03 .937 .081 .25 
INTERPRETER-PRESENT       
MS-absent: Detail 52 68 60 6.99 .863 .008 .37 
MS-present: Detail 52 72 62 3.04 .938 .081 .25 
 
Note: MS means model statement  
 
 
                                                          
1 This is not the same as the number of truth tellers and liars who included at least one self-
handicapping strategy in their statement. A total of 20% of truth tellers and 55% of liars did 
so, and this difference was significant. X2(1, N = 199) = 25.65, p < .001, phi = .36. 
